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Non-technical Summary 
Access to external financing is of high importance to companies for the financing of fixed 
investments. Investment in fixed assets occurs in irregular intervals and requires relatively 
large amounts of financing, whereas internal financing from cash flow accrues more 
continuously. For large investment projects internal financing is therefore unlikely to be 
sufficient. Bank financing is especially important for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), because they have no access to either the public equity market or to the corporate 
bond market. When companies apply for loans they are not sure whether they will actually 
receive financing. So far, little is known about how companies adjust their investment volume 
in case desired loans turn out to be unavailable. It is also not known which financing mix 
companies choose for the investment they are able to realize.  
Our main focus is on differences between innovative and non-innovative companies. Whereas 
debt financing is less well suited for innovative companies due to the higher uncertainty 
regarding their returns, equity financing has the advantage of the financier participating in the 
upside potential of the company. Innovative companies may be better able to cope with loan 
denials if they are able to substitute external equity for unavailable bank loans. 
The analysis is based on an annual company survey conducted by KfW Bankengruppe that is 
representative of German SMEs. We build on more than 4,500 observations relating to the 
years 2005 to 2007. The survey is unique in that it provides detailed information on planned 
investment, actual investment, experience with loan applications and innovative activities. 
Econometrically we control for the non-randomness of loan denials by estimating a selection 
equation for loan denials. We use the intensity of banking competition at the district level as 
an exclusion restriction to ensure identification is not only based on functional form 
assumptions. 
We find that innovative companies can better cope with loan denials. Compared with non-
innovators, innovators can realize additional 10.0 percentage points of the share of actual to 
planned investment when facing a loan denial. By investigating the mix of financing sources 
that companies ultimately use to finance their actual investment, we provide an explanation 
for the better performance. Innovative companies that experience a loan denial have the 
ability to increase the share of external equity in their financing mix. Facing a loan denial, 
innovators finance 6.7 % of their investment with external equity compared with only 1.1 % 
for non-innovators. External equity includes business angel financing, venture capital, and 
equity investment of new owners. Innovative companies may be turned down by banks 
because debt is not the optimal type of financing for them. If their investment projects are 
profitable, however, they may be able to attract equity investors. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Der Zugang zu externer Finanzierung ist für die Investitionsfinanzierung von Unternehmen 
von großer Bedeutung. Für Investitionen sind in größeren Abständen hohe Beträge 
erforderlich, wohingegen Mittel aus der Innenfinanzierung kontinuierlich zufließen. Für 
umfangreiche Investitionsvorhaben ist eine alleinige Innenfinanzierung meistens nicht 
ausreichend. Für kleine und mittlere Unternehmen (KMU) ist eine Finanzierung durch 
Banken besonders wichtig, da KMU keinen Zugang zur Börse oder zum Markt für 
Unternehmensanleihen haben. Wenn Unternehmen einen Kreditantrag stellen, können sie 
nicht sicher sein, ob er letztendlich genehmigt wird. Bislang ist nur wenig darüber bekannt, 
wie Unternehmen ihr Investitionsvolumen anpassen, wenn ihre Kreditanträge von den Banken 
abgelehnt werden. Ebenso ist nicht bekannt, welche Finanzierungsquellen Unternehmen für 
Investitionen wählen, wenn sie trotz Kreditablehnung in der Lage sind zu investieren. 
Der Schwerpunkt der Analyse liegt auf Unterschieden zwischen innovativen und nicht-
innovativen Unternehmen. Während eine Kreditfinanzierung für innovative Unternehmen 
durch die höhere Unsicherheit in ihren Erträgen weniger gut geeignet ist, hat die 
Eigenkapitalfinanzierung den Vorteil, dass der Investor im Erfolgsfall an den Erträgen 
partizipiert. Innovative Unternehmen können Kreditabsagen möglicherweise besser 
bewältigen als nicht-innovative Unternehmen, wenn sie nach erfolglosen 
Kreditverhandlungen zusätzliches Eigenkapital aufnehmen können. 
Die Analyse basiert auf einer jährlichen Unternehmensbefragung der KfW-Bankengruppe, die 
repräsentativ für den deutschen Mittelstand ist. Mehr als 4500 Beobachtungen mit 
Informationen für die Jahre 2005 bis 2007 stehen zur Verfügung. Diese Umfrage enthält 
Informationen über geplante Investitionen, tatsächliche Investitionen, Kreditverhandlungen 
und Innovationsaktivitäten. Ökonometrisch kontrollieren wir für den Einfluss 
unbeobachtbarer Unternehmenseigenschaften auf den Ausgang von Kreditverhandlungen mit 
einer Selektionsgleichung. Wir verwenden die Intensität des Bankenwettbewerbs auf 
Kreisebene als Ausschlussrestriktion, damit die Identifikation des statistischen Modells nicht 
nur auf Annahmen zur funktionalen Form beruht.  
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass innovative Unternehmen Kreditabsagen besser verkraften 
können. Verglichen mit Nicht-Innovatoren können Innovatoren im Fall einer Kreditablehnung 
zusätzliche 10,0 Prozentpunkte des Anteils von tatsächlichen zu geplanten Investitionen 
realisieren. Bei der Untersuchung der Zusammensetzung der Finanzierungsquellen, die 
Unternehmen letztlich für ihre realisierten Investitionen verwenden, finden wir eine Erklärung 
für das bessere Abschneiden. Von Banken abgelehnte innovative Unternehmen haben die 
Fähigkeit, den Anteil der externen Eigenkapitalfinanzierung zu erhöhen. Sie finanzieren 
6,7 % des Finanzierungsbedarfs mit externem Eigenkapital, während es bei von Banken 
abgelehnten Nicht-Innovatoren lediglich 1,1 % sind. Externe Eigenkapitalfinanzierung 
umfasst die Finanzierung durch Business Angels, Wagniskapital und 
Eigenkapitalbeteiligungen zusätzlicher Eigentümer. Innovative Unternehmen werden 
möglicherweise von Banken abgelehnt, da Kredite keine optimale Finanzierungsform für sie 
darstellen. Wenn ihre Investitionsprojekte profitabel sind, können sie jedoch teilweise neue 
Eigenkapitalinvestoren gewinnen.  
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Abstract 
This study examines the consequences of loan denials for the investment performance 
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1 Introduction 
Access to external financing is of high importance to companies for the financing of fixed 
investments. Investment in fixed assets occurs in irregular intervals and requires relatively 
large amounts of financing, whereas internal financing from cash flow accrues more 
continuously. For large investment projects internal financing is therefore unlikely to be 
sufficient. Bank financing is especially important for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), because they have no access to either the public equity market or to the corporate 
bond market. For example, Berger and Udell (1998) find for US small businesses that bank 
loans are with 27% of total financing the most important external source of financing. For 
German SMEs, Reize (2007) finds an even higher share for bank loans at 31%. When 
companies apply for loans they are not sure whether they will actually receive financing. So 
far, little is known about how companies adjust their investment volume in case desired loans 
turn out to be unavailable. It is also not known which financing mix companies choose for the 
investment they are able to realize. 
In this paper we investigate to which degree companies adjust their plans for fixed investment 
downwards if they are confronted with a loan denial. Our main focus is on differences 
between innovative and non-innovative companies. Whereas debt financing is less well suited 
for innovative companies due to the higher uncertainty regarding their returns, equity 
financing has the advantage of the financier participating in the upside potential of the 
company. Innovative companies may be better able to cope with loan denials if they are able 
to substitute external equity for unavailable bank loans. We also investigate how companies 
ultimately finance their actual investment if bank loans are not available. Two different 
concepts of an innovative company are employed. Based on an outcome measure, a company 
is an innovator if it has introduced a new product or a new process in the last three years. 
Using an input measure, companies are classified as innovative if they conduct either 
continuous or occasional research and development (R&D). 
Our analysis is based on an annual company survey conducted by KfW Bankengruppe that is 
representative of German SMEs. We build on more than 4,500 observations relating to the 
years 2005, 2006 and 2007. The survey is unique in that it provides detailed information on 
planned investment, actual investment, experience with loan applications and innovative 
activities. 
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It is fitting to study these questions for Germany, because the German financial system is 
bank-based as opposed to market-based, so banks are of especially high importance for the 
financing of companies. The German financial system is characterized by close, long-term 
relationships between banks and SMEs. Companies typically have a main bank that acts as 
premier lender and offers most banking services to the company (Audretsch and Elston, 
2002). As result of the bank-based system, companies rely heavily on bank loans and have 
traditionally a low equity ratio (Delbreil et al., 2005). 
We find that innovative companies can better cope with loan denials. Compared with non-
innovators, innovators can realize additional 10.0 percentage points of the share of actual to 
planned investment when facing a loan denial. By investigating the mix of financing sources 
that companies ultimately use to finance their actual investment we provide an explanation for 
the better performance. Innovative companies that experience a loan denial have the ability to 
increase the share of external equity in their financing mix. Facing a loan denial, innovators 
finance 6.7% of their investment with external equity compared with only 1.1% for non-
innovators. External equity includes business angel financing, venture capital, and equity 
investment of new owners. Innovative companies may be turned down by banks because debt 
is not the optimal type of financing for them. If their investment projects are profitable, 
however, they may be able to attract equity investors. 
Econometrically we control for the non-randomness of loan denials by estimating a selection 
equation for loan denials. We use the intensity of banking competition at the district level as 
an exclusion restriction to ensure identification is not only based on functional form 
assumptions. 
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature. The first strand investigates the 
relationship between the availability of bank loans and the investment performance of 
companies. Gan (2007a) sheds light on this relationship from the perspective of the company. 
Using the real estate crisis of Japan as natural experiment, she finds that companies with 
larger drops in collateral value find it more difficult to sustain lending relationships, have 
smaller credit growth and have smaller investment intensity (investment/total assets). More 
typically, this relationship is analyzed from the perspective of the bank. Gibson (1995) and 
Gan (2007b) find for Japanese companies that their investment volume is lower if the 
financial health of their main bank is weaker. These results suggests that companies may not 
be able to realize all profitable investment opportunities if access to bank loans is restricted. 
Using differences in an industry’s dependence on external financing, Dell’ Ariccia et al. 
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(2008) show that in times of banking crises company investment contracts more in sectors 
more dependent on external financing. Hancock and Wilcox (1998) use the period of the 
credit crunch in the US in the early 1990s to investigate the influence of loan volume on real 
economic activity at the state level. Their results show that the total loan volume at small 
banks has a larger influence on the employment of small companies than does the loan 
volume at large banks. Small companies often have bank relationships with small banks and 
cannot easily switch to other sources of financing should their main bank find itself in 
difficulty.  
The second strand to which our paper relates is the literature on financial constraints, which 
documents the role of the availability of internal financing for the investment behavior of 
companies. Hubbard (1998) provides a survey of this literature. The studies generally find 
that companies that are a priori believed to be more financially constrained have higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivities. Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) provide 
an extension by also investigating the role of cash flow for R&D expenditures. These papers 
find a significant relationship between cash flow and both general investment and R&D 
expenditures for US companies. Exploiting direct survey evidence to identify financing 
constraints, Winker (1999) documents a negative influence of financing constraints on 
investment and innovation expenditures for German companies. Also using direct survey 
evidence, Hottenrott and Peters (2009) find that companies with high innovative capability 
are more likely to be constrained in their innovative investments due to larger resource 
requirements. Some studies also investigate the role of access to external capital for realized 
investment. However, these studies do not use direct evidence on access to bank loans, but 
rely on credit ratings as a proxy for access (see, for example, Czarnitzki, 2006).1 
We extend the literature on the relationship between the availability of bank loans and the 
investment performance of companies by investigating theoretically expected differences 
between innovative and non-innovative companies. We provide direct insight into how loan 
denials affect companies by observing differences in planned and actual investment. By 
directly observing loan demand we extend the literature on financial constraints which is 
based on indirect evidence on the availability of external financing. Companies demonstrate 
with their loan application that they require external funding and that they generally think that 
bank financing is an appropriate source. A further advantage of our approach is that it allows 
                                                 
1 Direct evidence on access to bank loans is also used by studies showing that innovative companies are more 
likely to experience loan denials (see, for example, Guiso (1998) for high-tech companies and Freel (2007) for 
companies with high R&D expenditures). 
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us to directly quantify the effects of loan denials on the share of actual to planned investment. 
The investment-cash flow sensitivities do not allow for a direct calculation of the magnitude 
of the effect of higher costs of external financing for investment. To our knowledge this is the 
first paper to document the financing mix chosen by companies facing and not facing loan 
denials. 
The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework 
and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 explains the methodology; Section 4 describes the 
data; Section 5 presents the empirical analysis; and Section 6 concludes. 
2 Theoretical Framework 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that in perfect capital markets the investment volume of 
companies is independent of their capital structure. Different forms of financing are perfect 
substitutes and companies will always realize all projects with positive net present value. In 
reality, however, the Modigliani-Miller theorem is unlikely to hold, because financial markets 
are characterized by asymmetric information. Different forms of financing are not perfect 
substitutes and may differ in their adequacy for different companies, depending on the 
companies’ characteristics. 
For innovative companies equity financing has specific advantages compared with debt 
financing. Banks face special problems when appraising the quality of innovative projects 
(Hall, 2002). There is uncertainty concerning both technical feasibility and likely commercial 
success. It follows then that specialized technical know-how is necessary to judge the quality 
of loan applications from innovative companies. The high uncertainty is reflected in the 
typical return distribution of innovative companies characterized by very high returns if 
successful and a high probability of failure. This does not fit well with the obligation to honor 
regular interest rate payments of a constant amount. In addition, innovative companies have 
less collateral available, since a high share of R&D expenditures is used for the wages of 
researchers and does not increase the stock of tangible assets, such as machinery. A further 
difficulty, though affecting not only bank financing, is that innovative companies may be 
reluctant to share technological information with their financiers, since competitors may 
become aware of this knowledge (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). 
Debt financing may not be available for owners of innovative companies due to credit 
rationing. Innovative companies are more affected, because credit rationing is more severe if 
information is more asymmetric (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Credit rationing can occur in 
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equilibrium because it may not be profitable for banks to increase interest rates in response to 
excess demand for loans. A higher interest rate does not only reduce demand, it also increases 
the riskiness of the applicant pool. The losses due to higher default risk may outweigh the 
additional profits from the higher interest rate.  
Different types of financiers have developed different abilities to resolve problems of 
asymmetric information. Banks use screening techniques and collateral requirements to 
reduce their risk exposure. They also collect information through long-term relationships with 
the companies and through the provision of several financial services to the same company. 
Venture capital financing reduces information asymmetry and moral hazard by employing 
complex contract structures, using staged investments, and being actively involved in the 
management of the companies (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Gompers, 1995). This makes 
venture capital suitable for the financing of very innovative, high-risk companies, but the 
active involvement also makes this form of financing expensive. In general, equity investors 
are better able to cope with the high variance of returns of innovative companies. As residual 
claimants they gain from high expected returns and can therefore compensate for the higher 
probability of total failure. However, a precondition for investment is that expected returns 
are high enough to cover the costs of active engagement and of the risk of failure. 
From these theoretical considerations we conclude that innovative companies should be better 
able to cope with loan denials, since they can more easily switch to equity financing, an 
alternative financing source that is especially suitable for them. There can be three underlying 
mechanisms contributing to this outcome:  
First, it can be a strategy for companies to first try debt since it is cheaper and, if 
unsuccessful, try the alternative of equity financing. The pecking order theory predicts that 
companies with exhausted internal funds will try to get access to debt and only when the debt 
capacity is reached will companies consider additional equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Equity financing is more expensive than debt because investors need to deal with a higher 
degree of asymmetric information. Thus, even though equity financing has advantages for 
innovative companies, owners may try first to obtain debt financing. The interest payable for 
bank loans is much lower than the required returns of venture capitalists or other equity 
providers, and owners lose less control when taking out bank loans.  
Second, we also expect an influence of self-selection. Many owners of innovative companies 
will anticipate possible problems with access to bank financing. They will only engage in 
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innovative activities if access to alternative financing sources, such as equity capital or 
internally generated cash flow, seems likely. For example, it is found for German SMEs that a 
sufficiently high equity ratio positively affects the decision to conduct R&D activities, 
especially for young companies (Mueller and Zimmermann, 2008). The results of the study 
by Bond et al. (2006) can also be interpreted in the light of self-selection. The cash flow of 
British companies determines whether R&D is carried out but does not influence the level of 
R&D activity. Thus, sufficient cash flow is a precondition for R&D. The authors find that 
R&D performers are a self-selected group that faces fewer financial constraints than do 
companies without R&D.  
Third, owners of innovative companies may have not been aware of the suitability of equity 
financing. Banks may inform owners about the advantages of this form of financing when 
explaining the reasons for their denial. 
It is possible to derive two testable hypotheses to investigate our conjecture that innovative 
companies are better able to cope with loan denials. The first hypothesis relates to the 
investment performance of companies. We hypothesize that innovative companies are able to 
realize a higher share of their planned investment than non-innovative companies when facing 
a loan denial. The second hypothesis predicts how companies ultimately finance their 
investment. We hypothesize that innovative companies finance a larger share of their 
investment with external equity than non-innovative companies when confronted with a loan 
denial. It is expected that innovative companies are able, to a certain degree, to substitute 
external equity for unavailable debt. 
3 Methodology 
We use a Tobit model with a correction for selection as our preferred econometric model (see 
Wooldridge, 2002, p. 575ff.). Our dependent variable is the share of actual to planned 
investment. It has mass points at both zero and 100, which the Tobit model can account for. 
Loan denials are not random events, but are influenced by observed factors such as the equity 
ratio as well as private information that the banks possess either through their long-term 
relationship with the customer or through the assessment of the loan application. The main 
aspects of the private information of banks are the expected profitability of the company and 
the expected profitability of the investment project. This information is unobservable for us 
but may influence both the loan decision and the investment behavior. Neglecting its 
influence may result in selection effects that bias the estimates of the investment equation. Li 
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and Prabhala (2006) give a detailed account of the use of selection models in corporate 
finance. 
Hence our econometric model is an extension of the classical Heckman selection model 
(Heckman, 1976), consisting of the following equations: 
(1)              iidIiiIidii xIdIdy   '*       (main equation) 
(2)              iii uzd  '* .          (selection equation) 
*
iy  represents the latent variable for investment performance (share of actual to planned 
investment) for which the following observation rule applies: 
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applies, where di equals 1 if a loan denial is observed. The subscript i indicates measurement 
of the variables at the company level. As can be seen from equation (1), the loan denial 
dummy is interacted with an innovation dummy I. We are therefore able to test whether the 
loan denial effect is different for innovative and non-innovative companies, which is the first 
main question of this paper. Furthermore, xi represents a vector of additional variables 
explaining the share invested and zi is a vector of variables explaining loan denials. 
The error terms of the two equations are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with zero 
means, which yields the following variance-covariance matrix: 




1
2




u
u . 
Due to the non-zero covariance  u  in this correlation structure, the potential endogeneity of 
loan denial in equation (1) has to be addressed within the econometric framework. The two 
equations can be either estimated with full simultaneous maximum likelihood or with a two-
step procedure. We choose the two-step procedure for which it is necessary to include the 
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inverse Mills ratio 
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
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z
  as an additional variable in the main equation, where   
denotes the standard normal density and   denotes the cumulative standard normal 
distribution. When calculating the standard errors of the Tobit model one has to take into 
account that i  is estimated, which leads to a heteroscedastic i . We therefore employ a 
bootstrapping procedure to obtain correct standard errors. 
An exclusion restriction is necessary for the identification of the selection equation to not only 
rely on the functional form assumptions. For an exclusion restriction to be valid, the variable 
excluded from the main equation has to be related to the dependent variable of the selection 
equation but unrelated to the error term of the main equation. We use the intensity of banking 
competition as exclusion restriction. A higher density of bank subsidiaries in a district implies 
more competition. Banks may be more reluctant to deny loans because customers have more 
options to move their bank business to competitors. Because richer districts may attract more 
banks and companies in richer districts may be able to realize a higher share of their planned 
investment, we also control for the average income of households in the district. As additional 
controls at the district level we use dummies for the degree of urbanization. There may be 
differences in investment behavior in urban and rural areas and urban areas may attract more 
banks. Beyond the regional characteristics we control for, we believe that it is unlikely that 
the intensity of banking competition would have a direct influence on the share of planned 
investment that companies can realize. Although there is no formal test on the validity of an 
exclusion restriction, we performed a rough check by including the variable Banking 
competition in the main equation and found it to be insignificant. 
Due to the non-linearity of our employed model, estimated coefficients do not correspond to 
marginal effects. We present marginal effects in the regression tables, because they show the 
economic significance of the results. We calculate average marginal effects, i.e. we change 
one regressor keeping the remaining regressors at their original values and then calculate the 
average of the thus obtained marginal effect over all observations. For dummy variables we 
evaluate changes from zero to one.2  The main variables of interest are the dummy for loan 
denial, the dummy capturing innovativeness and their interaction term. For the calculation of 
the two base effects of the interaction, we hold the respective other variable constant at zero, 
e.g., we calculate the marginal effect for loan denial holding innovativeness constant at zero 
and we calculate the marginal effect for innovativeness holding loan denial constant at zero. 
                                                 
2 We use the Stata command “margins” for all calculations. 
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The marginal effect of the interaction term is then calculated as the simultaneous change of 
loan denial and of innovativeness from zero to one. It is calculated as the double difference 
ii
i
Id
y

2
 . With this calculation of the marginal effects we can obtain the total effect of loan 
denial and innovativeness by adding the marginal effects of the base terms and the interaction 
term. 
4  Data 
4.1 Data Source 
The analysis is based on an annual survey of German SMEs, which has been conducted since 
2003 by KfW Bankengruppe, Frankfurt/Main (KfW-Mittelstandspanel). The survey is 
representative for companies with maximum annual sales of 500 million Euro without a 
minimum requirement for the number of employees. It covers manufacturing, services, 
construction, retail and wholesale trade. The three waves with company information relating 
to the years 2005-2007 contain the necessary information for this study, namely the volume of 
planned and actual investment as well as detailed information on loan negotiations and 
innovative activity. The observation of planned investment and of the outcomes of loan 
negotiations is an important advantage of our data. For more detailed information on the data 
source see Reize and Lo (2008). 
The sample of the survey is stratified according to six size classes (up to 4 employees, 5-9, 
10-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100 or more employees), five industries (manufacturing, 
construction, retail, wholesale, and services), two regions (Western and Eastern Germany), 
and participation in a government support program for SMEs conducted by KfW 
Bankengruppe. For the years 2005-2007 the survey achieved a response rate of between 
18.2% and 23.4%, which is in the typical range for company surveys.  
From our research question it follows that we restrict the analysis to companies with planned 
or actual investment that also conducted loan negotiations. Figure A1 in the Appendix 
clarifies the selection procedure and presents the structure of the available information. 
The three employed waves contain a total of 34,545 observations with information for 20,408 
different companies. The restriction to companies with planned or actual investments leads to 
24,256 observations (15,941 companies). Further restricting the sample to companies with 
demand for bank loans results in 10,438 observations (8,021 companies). The elimination of 
implausible values leaves us with 7,333 observations (5,668 companies). Specifically, we 
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omit companies with return on sales of larger than 101% or smaller than -101%, with an 
equity ratio of smaller than -110%, and with inconsistent balance sheet information. With the 
further restriction to observations with non-missing entries in the regression variables we 
arrive at the final data set used for the analysis with 4,587 observations (3,543 companies) for 
the differentiation according to innovator/non-innovator and with 4,582 observations (3,548 
companies) for the differentiation according to R&D activity. 
The survey is conducted as a panel, but the time dimension of our data is very limited. On 
average we have only 1.3 observations per company. On the one hand this is due to 
companies not responding in specific years; on the other hand, especially small companies do 
not plan to invest every year and do not have demand for additional bank financing every 
year. We rely on the cross-sectional information of the data and do not use panel estimators, 
since we would otherwise lose too many observations. Specifically, 58% of the companies are 
observed only once. All standard errors are clustered at the company level and are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. 
4.2 Endogenous and Exogenous Variables 
The dependent variable of our analysis is Share invested. It is defined as the amount of actual 
investment divided by the amount of planned investment in a specific year. The variable is 
bounded between zero and 100. In a first step respondents are asked for the volume of actual 
fixed investment. Next they are asked which amount of the planned fixed investment they 
could not realize. Share invested is therefore calculated as follows: 
(3)              
investmentactualinvestmentrealizednotbutplanned
investmentactualinvestedShare           
Fixed investment includes, for example, investments in buildings, machinery, office 
equipment, and acquisitions of other companies. The survey does not cover cases in which 
more investment than planned has been realized. It is important to note that the survey 
question does not restrict to investment that could not be realized due to unavailability of 
finance. The amount not realized contains also cases of technological infeasibility or cases 
where at a later stage of the planning process it was found that a project was not profitable 
after all. 
The survey provides information on whether all, some, or none of the loan negotiations of a 
given year were successful. If only some or no negotiations were successful, it is reported 
whether the company did receive a loan offer from the bank for at least one ultimately failed 
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negotiation. If this is the case we can conclude that the company declined at least one offer 
itself. From this information we build two variables capturing loan denial. For our basic 
results we use the variable Loan denial A. It is equal to one if a company for which none or 
only some negotiations were successful did not receive an offer from a bank for at least one 
ultimately failed application. It is zero if a company was always successful with negotiations 
or declined at least one offer itself. The idea behind this grouping is that companies that 
decline an offer are less credit-constrained than companies that do not receive an offer at all. 
The average value of Share invested is 94.8% for companies that were always successful with 
their loan negotiations, 81.9% for companies that declined at least one offer by a bank, and 
54.3% for companies that did not receive an offer from their bank at least once for an 
ultimately failed negotiation. The mean values of actual investment volume are 1.2 million 
Euro, 1.0 million Euro, and 0.4 million Euro, respectively. Thus, if a company declines a loan 
offer in our sample this has to be interpreted in the sense that this company is not really 
dependent on the money from the one bank but has access to alternative sources of financing.3 
Declining an offer is typically not the outcome of a situation in which banks make very 
unfavorable offers in the anticipation that the companies will not take them up. 
As a robustness check we use the variable Loan denial B, which is equal to one if a company 
was never successful with loan negations and, additionally, did never receive an offer from a 
bank. This is a very strict definition of loan denial. In contrast to Loan denial A it does not 
include companies which were successful with some negotiations. Figure A1 in the Appendix 
also includes a diagrammatic depiction of the definitions of the loan denial variables. 
The loan applications in our sample refer to spot loans and not to lines of credit. A line of 
credit gives the company the right to borrow up to a specified amount over a certain period 
for a price that is specified in advance (Martin and Santomero, 1997). Lines of credit are an 
important form of bank commercial lending in the US. For SMEs in the US, 52% of lending 
from financial institutions takes the form of lines of credit, the rest being composed of spot 
loans. Lines of credit are normally used to finance working capital, whereas large investments 
are funded with spot loans (Berger and Udell, 1998). Lines of credit are not common in 
Germany where most commercial lending is arranged via spot lending contracts. Companies 
start negotiations with banks at the time they experience the credit need. Analysis of our data 
shows that only 4% of the investment volume is financed via an overdraft facility.  
                                                 
3 Companies without loan negotiations realize on average an investment volume of 0.4 million Euros, the same 
volume as companies that did not receive an offer from their bank at least once. Internal sources of finance are 
presumably sufficient for smaller investment volumes. 
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Two different concepts are used to differentiate between innovative and non-innovative 
companies. First, the dummy Innovator is equal to one if a company introduced a new 
product or a new process in the three years preceding the survey, and zero otherwise. Second, 
the dummy Continuous R&D is equal to one if the company performs R&D continuously, i.e. 
has positive R&D expenditures in each of the past years; the dummy Occasional R&D is 
equal to one if the company performs R&D only occasionally, which means that the company 
had positive R&D expenditures in some years in the past, but not in all. The reference 
category is companies without R&D activities. Innovation is measured at the company and 
not at the project level in both cases. A separate analysis of the data source used for this study 
reveals that the reasons for loan denials are mostly grounded in company characteristics and 
not in project characteristics (Reize, 2007). Banks cite insufficient collateral as reason in 73% 
of denials, insufficient creditworthiness in 41% of denials, and an unprofitable investment 
project in only 8% of denials (multiple answers were possible).  
We include several control variables for company characteristics. The control for company 
size is the number of employees at full-time equivalents and its square (Employees and 
Employees squared). Company age is covered as years since founding and its square (Age and 
Age squared). Return on sales is calculated as the amount of profits after taxes divided by the 
amount of sales. Equity ratio is defined as equity divided by total assets. Capital intensity is 
measured as tangible assets divided by total assets. The variable Capital intensity proxies for 
the ability of the company to provide collateral. Furthermore, we include a dummy variable 
Limited liability, which is equal to one if the legal form of the company is characterized by 
limited liability. The variable West Germany is equal to one if the company is located in the 
western part of Germany. If a company has participated in a government support program 
conducted by KfW Bankengruppe, the variable Support program is equal to one. We also 
include year dummies and industry dummies measured at the 2-digit SIC level. Our controls 
include all variables that were used for the stratification of the sample. 
As exclusion restriction for the selection equation we use Banking competition. This variable 
is defined at the district level as the number of bank subsidiaries active in a district divided by 
the population measured in 10,000 of the district.4 Data on the number of subsidiaries at the 
district level were obtained from the Bundesbank, the German central bank. The variable is 
                                                 
4 Germany is divided into 439 districts (Kreis or kreisfreie Stadt). Berlin is the largest district with a population 
of 3.4 million and Zweibrücken is the smallest district with a population of 36,000 (in the year 2000). Since 
districts vary greatly with respect to size and more bank subsidiaries will be active in larger districts, we use the 
population as normalization. 
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time-invariant and measured for the year 2000. Unfortunately, this statistic is not available for 
later years. The majority of subsidiaries is from cooperative banks (Volks- und 
Raiffeisenbanken), from savings banks (Sparkassen), and from private banks (e.g. Deutsche 
Bank). We exclude building associations, investment trusts, and subsidiaries from foreign 
banks that act as pure correspondence banks, because they do not extend loans to companies. 
At the district level we also control for the average income per resident in 1,000 Euro in the 
year 2000 (Income district level). We include dummies to differentiate among the district 
types rural district, urban district, and metropolitan area. The district type data relate to the 
year 2002.5 Since the employed district characteristics are quite time consistent, we choose to 
measure them for one year only.  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The variable 
Share invested shows a high degree of variation. Its minimum at zero is due to companies 
which planned to invest but were unable to invest at all in a given year. Its maximum at 100 
covers companies that are able to realize the full amount of planned investments. On average, 
companies can realize 87.5% of their planned investments. 13% of the companies experience 
a loan denial according to our basic definition of Loan denial A. According to the narrower 
definition of Loan denial B the share is 7.5%. 
Sixty-four percent of the companies are classified as innovators. The share of companies with 
R&D activities is substantially smaller; 17.3% perform R&D activities continuously and 
14.0% perform R&D occasionally. The average number of employees is 69, as could be 
expected for a survey of SMEs. On average, companies have return on sales of 3.8%, an 
equity ratio of 18.0%, and a capital intensity of 37.1%. 65.1% of the companies participate in 
a government support program, which means that they are overrepresented in this survey. 
The exclusion restriction Banking competition has an average value of 5.4, indicating that 5.4 
bank subsidiaries serve on average a population of 10,000. 
                                                 
5 Income per capita and population figures are taken from Statistic regional 2004, German National Statistical 
Offices (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder). The categorization of district types follows INKAR 
2004, Federal Office for Construction and Regional Planning (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung). 
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5 Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Access to Bank Loans and Realization of Investment Plans 
Table 2, columns 1 and 2, presents the two steps of the Tobit model with selection correction. 
It shows results for our basic measure of loan denial, Loan denial A, and for the classification 
of companies into innovators and non-innovators. The selection equation in column 1 is a 
probit regression with the dummy for a loan denial as dependent variable. Our exclusion 
restriction Banking competition is significant at the 1% level. Its negative sign indicates that a 
higher degree of competition is related to a smaller probability of a loan denial. With higher 
competition banks may be more reluctant to deny loan applications, because customers have 
more opportunities to move their business to competitors should they be unsuccessful with 
their loan request. As is expected from theory, innovators have a higher probability of 
experiencing a loan denial because they have a more dispersed return distribution. The other 
company characteristics also confirm expectations. Higher values of Return on sales, Equity 
ratio, and Capital intensity each decrease the probability of a loan denial. Larger companies, 
older companies, and companies with limited liability have smaller denial probabilities. The 
further controls for district level characteristics do not turn out to be significant (variables not 
shown in the table). 
Column 2 includes the investment equation with selection correction, which has Share 
invested as dependent variable. The dummy Loan denial A has, as expected, the largest 
influence. The share of realized investment decreases by 68.1 percentage points when a non-
innovator faces a loan denial. The size of the marginal effect has to be interpreted in 
comparison with the basis category of a non-innovator with no denial. The results further 
show that innovators without a denial realize a 1.8 percentage point smaller value of Share 
invested than non-innovators without a denial. This can be explained by the higher 
technological and demand uncertainty faced by innovators. As companies obtain more 
information over time, they realize that some envisaged projects are unprofitable after all and 
should be cancelled.  
Of most interest to our research question is the positive and significant marginal effect on the 
interaction term of Loan denial A and Innovator. This implies that having the attribute of 
Innovator the negative effect of loan denial is 11.8 percentage points lower than for non-
innovators.6 The results also show that the positive effect of interaction between Loan denial 
                                                 
6 It also implies that having the attribute of Loan denial A innovators are able to realize additional 11.8 
percentage points of Share invested compared to non-innovators. 
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A and Innovator even outweighs the negative innovation effect. Innovators with denials are 
able to invest 10.0 percentage points more than can non-innovators with denials.7 Thus, 
innovators are better able to cope with loan a denial, which confirms our first hypothesis. The 
projects of innovative companies are likely to be risky but may generate high expected 
returns. Even if banks deny a loan because of the high risk, companies may still be able to 
find alternative financing sources if the returns are attractive. Banks are sometimes not able to 
judge the prospects of very innovative companies, because specialized technical and market-
oriented knowledge would be necessary to do so. It can be rational for banks not to invest in 
this knowledge and to forgo the possibility of providing finance to this type of company. 
Of the company control variables only Return on sales and Support program are significant. 
Return on sales has probably a persistent component and is therefore partly forward looking. 
It can be expected that profitable companies are again profitable in the future and are thus 
more likely to realize their investment projects.8 The insignificant regressors Equity ratio and 
Capital intensity reflect the resources available inside the company. Our results should not be 
interpreted to mean that these variables are not important for the investment performance. 
Both variables play an indirect role by improving the access to bank loans as shown in the 
first step. The large effect of loan denial on Share invested in the second step shows that this 
access is the most important factor influencing the share of realized investment. 
The variable Inverse Mills ratio corrects for selectivity. Its positive sign means that 
unobserved company characteristics have a positive influence both on Loan denial A and on 
Share invested. The variable Rho gives the correlation between the error terms of the first and 
the second step regressions. The value of 0.46 is evidence for a relatively high positive 
correlation. This is an indication that unobserved factors indeed influence both the credit 
decision by the bank and the capacity of the company to realize investment plans. 
It is instructive to compare the results of the investment equation with and without selection 
correction (column 2 and column 3) to get an impression of the influence of selectivity. 
Column 3 without selection correction shows higher marginal effects and higher significance 
levels for some company characteristics. The variables Return on sales, Equity ratio and 
Employees proxy partly for unobserved company characteristics, such as the quality of the 
                                                 
7 This value is calculated as the sum of the marginal effects of Innovator and the interaction term. 
8 The financial constraints literature uses cash flow related variables, such as return on sales, in order to identify 
financial restrictions (see e.g. Bond et al., 2006 or Engel and Middendorf, 2009). We are able to directly control 
for financial constraints with our loan denial variables. In our model return on sales has the more direct 
interpretation of profitability. 
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management and stability. Once these unobservables are controlled for by the selection 
equation, these variables have a diminished role. In contrast, the influence of the loan denial 
itself is higher when selection is controlled for. 
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 2 display regression results when using R&D activity to classify 
companies into innovative and non-innovative. The selection equation in column 4 shows 
again a significant influence of Banking competition. Furthermore, companies with either 
occasional or continuous R&D face a higher probability of a loan denial. The size of the effect 
of R&D is almost double the size of the effect of being an innovator in the analogous 
specification of column 1. Thus performing R&D is a larger obstacle for obtaining bank 
finance than introducing a new product or a new process. A major difference between the two 
classifications for innovativeness is that conducting R&D takes place at an earlier stage of the 
innovation process than the introduction of new products or processes. Conducting R&D is a 
pure input factor. When conducting R&D it is not clear that the activity will result in a 
marketable product. In contrast, innovators have already been successful with the introduction 
of a new product or process. Performing R&D implies therefore a higher level of risk. 
Column 5 displays the investment equation with selection correction. As before, the dummy 
for loan denial has quantitatively the largest influence on Share invested. Companies without 
R&D facing a denial have to cut down the share of realized investment by 60.4 percentage 
points compared with the reference category of companies without R&D and with successful 
loan negotiations. Reflecting uncertainty, the dummies for occasional and continuous R&D 
are negative. The dummy for continuous R&D is smaller in absolute value, suggesting that 
companies with continuous R&D have to cut back less, possibly because they have more 
experience with the planning of risky projects.  
The interaction term for occasional R&D and loan denial is insignificant. Thus, companies 
with occasional R&D have no better investment performance than companies without R&D 
when facing a loan denial. Conducting only occasional R&D may make companies not 
attractive enough for equity investors seeking high risk-high return investments. We can 
therefore not confirm Hypothesis 1 for this company type. In contrast, the interaction term for 
companies with continuous R&D is positive and significant. Companies with continuous 
R&D may be more attractive for equity investors and may have been more active in exploring 
alternatives to a bank loan from the beginning than have companies with only occasional 
R&D. Companies facing a loan denial and conducting continuous R&D are able to invest 9.9 
percentage points more of Share invested than companies facing a loan denial without R&D 
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activity. Again, this value is calculated as the sum of the marginal effect of continuous R&D 
(-2.2 percentage points) and the marginal effect of the interaction term (12.1 percentage 
points). The loss through uncertainty at the planning stage is more than compensated for 
through better performance after a loan denial for companies with continuous R&D. Our 
results are therefore consistent with Hypothesis 1. We can conclude that companies with 
continuous R&D activity are better able to cope with loan denials. The influence of the other 
control variables is very similar to the analogous specification of the second step for the 
innovator characteristic (column 2).  
5.2 Robustness Checks 
In Table 3 we present robustness checks with the more stringent definition of loan denial, 
Loan denial B, which confirm our key findings. The exclusion restriction Banking 
competition is again significant in the first steps. A loan denial is still quantitatively the most 
important influence on the share of planned investment that can be realized. Furthermore, 
being an innovator has a negative effect on Share invested. The interaction term between 
being an innovator and loan denial is positive and significant and outweighs the negative base 
effect of innovation. Hence, our result that innovators can better cope with loan denials than 
non-innovators is confirmed. The investment patterns for companies with occasional and 
continuous R&D are also confirmed with the alternative loan denial measure. As before, only 
companies with continuous R&D are better able to cope with loan denials. Companies with 
occasional R&D show no better performance than companies without R&D when facing a 
denial.  
Interestingly, the Inverse Mills ratio is now insignificant for both measures of innovation and 
the correlation coefficient Rho is close to zero. This indicates that selection on unobservables 
is of minor importance for Loan denial B. The marginal effects and significance levels of the 
regressors of the investment equation with and without control for selectivity are 
consequently very similar. Hence, estimating a two step procedure is not necessary for this 
specification from an econometric point of view. Specifically, a comparison of the results of 
columns 3 and 4 as well as columns 5 and 6 shows that the marginal effect of Loan denial B is 
very similar for the one-step and two-step procedure. The same holds true for the interaction 
term.9 
                                                 
9 As further exploration we checked the robustness of the results with loan denial variables that do not condition 
on the company not receiving an offer from a bank at least once (results not shown), i.e. a denial also takes place 
if the company declines at least one offer itself. The analogue to Loan denial A is equal to one if a company was 
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5.3 Financing Mix for Actual Investment 
Tables 4 and 5 show how companies ultimately finance their actual investment. We are able 
to differentiate between external equity, mezzanine capital, bank loans, internal funds, public 
funds and other sources. Companies are classified into four groups according to innovative 
and non-innovative, and experiencing and not experiencing loan denials. From the tables it 
can be seen whether innovative companies move into different forms of financing when 
confronted with a loan denial. 
Table 4 presents the results of our basic, less stringent, measure of access to bank loans, Loan 
denial A, which also includes companies that were sometimes successful with loan 
applications. Our second hypothesis predicts that innovative companies facing loan denials 
use external equity more heavily. External equity financing includes equity investments and 
investments with equity characteristics of new owners, including venture capital and business 
angel financing. Innovators with a loan denial finance 6.7% of their investment with external 
equity whereas innovators without problems in access to bank loans use this form of financing 
only for 1.1% of total investment. The shares for companies with R&D activity are 9.2% and 
0.7%, respectively.10 We thus find a quantitatively important move towards external equity 
financing for innovative companies experiencing loan denials, which confirms our second 
hypothesis. This result can partly explain why innovative companies are able to realize a 
higher share of their planned investment than non-innovative companies, when facing a loan 
denial. To get a better understanding of this result, we compare the R&D intensity (R&D 
expenditure/sales) of innovative companies with and without loan denials and find that the 
ones with loan denials have on average a higher R&D intensity. They constitute therefore the 
subgroup of innovative companies that are more attractive for alternative sources of financing, 
such as venture capital. This result is found for both measures of innovativeness.  
Our results are consistent with the findings of Gatchev et al. (2009) for listed companies in 
the US. The authors investigate, among else, which financing sources companies use for 
different types of investments. Expenses for R&D and advertising are predominantly financed 
                                                                                                                                                        
successful with none or some negotiations irrespective of whether it received an offer from the bank or not. We 
find that innovative companies can invest significantly more when facing a loan denial, but a value of Rho larger 
than one indicates problems with the specification. As analogue to Loan denial B we explored the robustness of 
the results for a loan denial variable which is equal to one if a company was never successful with loan 
negotiations irrespective of whether it received an offer from the bank or not. Again, we find that innovative 
companies can invest significantly more when facing a loan denial. Finding similar results for the four loan 
denial measures that can be built from our data makes us confident in the robustness of the results. 
10 For this part of the analysis we combine companies with continuous and occasional R&D into one group to 
achieve a higher number of observations. 
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by equity issues, whereas investment in net fixed assets are financed with long-term debt 
issues and equity issues with equal shares. Equity is therefore used for investments with a 
high degree of information asymmetry. 
For mezzanine capital (e.g., subordinated loans, profit participation rights, silent partnerships) 
we also see an increased use by innovative companies facing a loan denial, but the increase is 
smaller than that for external equity. Having characteristics of both debt and equity, this 
financing form is also well suited for innovative companies. For example, the junior tranche 
of subordinated loans does not require collateral and no fixed interest payment is required for 
profit participation rights. Overall, mezzanine capital is more heavily used by innovative than 
by non-innovative companies, though the absolute importance of this financing form is 
limited. 
Bank loans are the most important type of financing for all subgroups.11 For innovative 
companies this financing type is about 10 percentage points less important than for non-
innovative companies, which conforms to theoretical expectations. We find that for 
investment projects of German SMEs bank loans are a more important form of external 
funding than new equity. This is in contrast to the result by Gatchev et al. (2009) for listed 
companies, which shows that additional fixed assets are financed to equal parts by new debt 
and new equity. The higher reliance on bank loans by SMEs can be explained by the lack of 
access to public equity markets. 
The share of bank financing for companies facing a denial may seem rather high. This is due 
to the fact that the group of companies facing at least one denial is a group with possibly more 
than one loan negotiation, of which some could be successful. Even though they experience 
problems, companies may still be able to use bank financing. Especially companies using 
bank finance heavily are likely to negotiate several loans and have therefore a higher 
probability that at least one negotiation is unsuccessful. This can explain why for non-
innovative companies with a denial the share of bank financing even shows a slight increase. 
It is also important to note that only companies with positive actual investment can be 
included in this part of the analysis. Of the companies facing a loan denial 18.2% had to 
cancel their investment plans completely and are therefore not included. This exclusion leads 
                                                 
11 This result is due to the fact that only companies conducting loan negotiations are examined within this 
analysis. For all SMEs internal funds are the most important type of financing with a share of 43% in 2006, 
whereas bank loans are used to finance 31% of investments (Reize, 2007). 
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to a bias towards companies with access to some form of finance, even if they experienced 
some problems. 
Innovative companies without a denial use a higher share of internal funds (e.g., current and 
accumulated past profits) than do innovative companies facing a denial. A strong internal 
contribution to the investment project is probably a precondition for banks to extend loans to 
innovative companies, since internal funds act as a risk buffer. There are no differences with 
respect to the use of internal funds for non-innovative companies with or without a loan 
denial. 
Public funds are comprised of bank loans with subsidized interest rates, for which the state 
takes on part of the default risk and of equity capital provided through government agencies. 
We find that companies with denials use a smaller share of public funds, because our 
definition of loan denials partly includes unsuccessful applications for public funds. 
Table 5 shows the robustness check for our alternative measure of access to bank loans, Loan 
denial B. This more stringent measure includes companies only in the ‘denied’ category, if 
they were never successful with their applications. In the robustness check we find an even 
more profound increase in the use of external equity for innovative companies with denied 
loan applications. Differences in the financing shares have to be interpreted in the light of the 
more stringent denial measure. Companies with no successful loan application are under more 
pressure to access alternative sources of financing. This robustness check also provides 
support for our second hypothesis.12 In contrast to our basic measure of loan denial, we find 
no increase in the use of mezzanine capital for innovative companies facing a denial. 
With the more stringent loan denial measure we observe a larger drop in bank loans for 
unsuccessful companies as would be expected. The share of bank financing does not drop to 
zero because bank financing also includes the use of overdraft facilities. For companies facing 
a denial, around 80% of the bank loans are represented by the use of an overdraft facility, for 
which in general no separate negotiation takes place.13  
It is important to note that companies worst hit by loan denials are the ones completely 
precluded from investing. These companies are excluded from the financing mix results, 
                                                 
12 As for the regression results, we also checked the robustness of the results for the analogues of Loan denial A 
and Loan denial B defining a denial also to have taken place if the company declines an offer from a bank. For 
both alternative definitions we see a strong increase in the use of external equity for innovative companies facing 
a denial but not for non-innovative companies facing a denial. Thus, the second hypothesis is also confirmed for 
the analogous measures. 
13 A differentiation between overdrafts and other bank loans is only possible for the year 2006. 
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because they have no investment to finance. This consideration explains why we observe an 
increased use of internal funds for denied companies, whether innovative or not, when using 
the Loan denial B measure. Only denied companies which can fall back on alternative 
financing sources are able to invest if all negotiations with banks fail. Denied non-innovative 
companies mainly fall back on internal funds whereas denied innovative companies are able 
to access external equity. Interestingly, for the less stringent measure, Loan denial A, we find 
a smaller share of internal funds for innovative companies facing a denial instead of a larger 
share for Loan denial B. For the less stringent measure it is not the effect of substitution into 
different forms of financing that dominates, but the requirement of having a strong equity 
base in order to access bank loans. 
6 Conclusions 
In this study we investigate how loan denials influence the investment and financing behavior 
of companies. We find that innovative companies are better able to deal with loan denials. 
Specifically, innovators are able to realize 10.0 percentage points more of the share of actual 
to planned investment than non-innovative companies. Innovative companies are able to rely 
more on the alternative financing source of external equity, when confronted with a loan 
denial. It has to be remarked, however, that even though innovative companies can better cope 
with loan denials, a loan denial nevertheless implies a substantial reduction in the investment 
volume in absolute terms. 
Our study has implications for economic policy and for managers of companies. For policy 
makers it is not only important to know which types of companies have access to bank loans, 
but also to know how investment is affected if no access is available. From the shift of 
innovative companies into equity it can be learned that not only sufficient provision of funds 
through banks is important but that equity markets have to work as well. This allows 
companies to choose the form of financing that is best suited for them. From a management 
perspective, our results stress the importance of anticipating the possibility of a loan denial 
and to take equity-based financing alternatives early into consideration. However, it should 
also be noted that venture capital as a specific form of external equity is suitable for only a 
small share of SMEs in Germany. Reize and Zimmermann (2009) show that in particular 
companies with a high R&D intensity or with continuous R&D activity are financing a 
relative high share of their innovation expenditures with venture capital. 
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One limitation of our study is the need to restrict the analysis to companies that planned to 
invest and also planned to use bank loans for the financing of the investment. This selection 
excludes companies that are from the start discouraged from filing a loan application because 
they expect a denial anyway. It also excludes companies with a very high level of innovative 
activity that try venture capital financing as their first option. Furthermore, we also exclude 
companies that have small investment volumes for which internal funding is sufficient and 
companies which have sufficient internal funding even for large investment projects. 
However, our results are relevant for SMEs with high economic importance. Of the 58% of 
German SMEs which invested or planned to invest in the year 2007, 36% had a need for 
external financing for their investment. Our sample selection criteria thus cover 21% of 
German SMEs. These companies are responsible for 29% of the employment in German 
SMEs. Considering that many companies invest and try to access external funding not every 
year, our results are relevant for companies with an even higher share of economic activity.14  
In future research it would be worthwhile to extend this work in two directions. First, it would 
be interesting to investigate the long-term consequences of loan denials for the performance 
and survival of companies. Second, it would be interesting to investigate the consequences of 
problems with access to other forms of external financing in addition to bank loans. 
                                                 
14 Restricted to the observations in our sample and thus not representative for the overall economy, we find that 
in the year 2007 30% of the companies planned to invest and tried to access bank loans. When we extend the 
time period for these activities to happen at least once to the three years of 2005-20007, this share increases to 
41% of companies. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev Min Max 
Share invested (in %) 87.54 100 26.63 0 100 
Loan denial A 0.130 0 0.337 0 1 
Loan denial B 0.075 0 0.263 0 1 
Innovator 0.639 1 0.480 0 1 
Occasional R&D 0.140 0 0.347 0 1 
Continuous R&D 0.173 0 0.379 0 1 
Employees 69.34 34 135.2 0.5 3550 
Age (in years) 38.12 18 40.84 2 414 
Return on sales (in %) 3.805 2.44 9.130 -100 91.62 
Equity ratio (in %) 17.95 15.95 21.71 -103.33 100 
Capital intensity (in %) 37.05 33.53 25.49 0 108.59 
Limited liability 0.768 1 0.422 0 1 
West Germany 0.610 1 0.488 0 1 
Support program 0.651 1 0.477 0 1 
Banking competition 5.402 4.66 2.325 2.28 17.58 
Note: The descriptive statistics are not weighted by survey weights. They reflect the distribution in the 
survey. 
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 Table 2: Basic Results for Investment Performance (Loan Denial A) 
 Two-step approach One-step 
appr. 
Two-step approach One-step 
appr. 
 First step Second 
step 
 First step Second 
step 
 
Dependent variable Loan denial 
A 
Share inv. Share inv. Loan 
denial A 
Share inv. Share inv. 
Model Probit Tobit Tobit Probit Tobit Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Banking competition # -0.0080***   -0.0086***   
 (0.0030) (0.0030)  
Loan denial A #  -68.09*** -40.97*** -60.35*** -34.75***
  (10.71) (3.32) (11.83) (2.17)
Innovator # 0.041*** -1.77*** -2.35***  
 (0.011) (0.603) (0.634)  
Interaction Loan denial A x   11.77*** 11.01***  
Innovator #  (3.42) (3.70)    
Occasional R&D #  0.072*** -2.61*** -3.62***
  (0.018) (0.913) (1.01)
Continuous R&D #  0.073*** -2.15** -3.16***
  (0.018) (0.916) (1.00)
Interaction Loan denial A x  3.80 1.91
Occ. R&D #     (4.15) (4.32) 
Interaction Loan denial A x  12.08*** 9.73**
Con. R&D #     (3.24) (3.94) 
Return on sales -0.0040*** 0.089* 0.157*** -0.0038*** 0.096** 0.156***
 (0.0007) (0.047) (0.041) (0.0007) (0.046) (0.040)
Equity ratio -0.0017*** 0.021 0.048*** -0.0017*** 0.025 0.050***
 (0.0002) (0.020) (0.015) (0.0002) (0.019) (0.015)
Capital intensity -0.0005*** 0.0058 0.015 -0.0006*** 0.0034 0.012
 (0.0002) (0.014) (0.015) (0.0002) (0.016) (0.015)
Employees -0.0004*** 0.0064 0.011** -0.0004*** 0.0081 0.012**
 (0.0001) (0.0058) (0.0048) (0.0001) (0.0055) (0.0048)
Employees2/10,000 0.0013*** -0.0095 -0.023 0.0013*** -0.016 -0.030*
 (0.0003) (0.037) (0.018) (0.0003) (0.033) (0.018)
Age -0.0008*** -0.0093 0.0029 -0.0008*** -0.012 -0.0012
 (0.0002) (0.017) (0.015) (0.0003) (0.017) (0.015)
Age2/10,000 0.036*** -0.025 -0.579 0.036*** 0.020 -0.483
 (0.0096) (0.843) (0.617) (0.0096) (0.867) (0.626)
Limited liability # -0.029** -0.156 0.359 -0.034** -0.066 0.482
 (0.014) (0.892) (0.853) (0.014) (0.917) (0.856)
West Germany # -0.043** 0.130 1.14 -0.047** 0.524 1.54
 (0.020) (0.995) (1.00) (0.020) (1.09) (1.02)
Support program # -0.055*** 1.59** 2.39*** -0.056*** 1.96** 2.69***
 (0.012) (0.816) (0.737) (0.011) (0.879) (0.741)
Inverse Mills ratio  7.06** 6.49** 
  (3.28) (3.24) 
Observations 4587 4587 4587 4582 4582 4582
Pseudo R-squared 0.114 0.064 0.064 0.121 0.063 0.063
Log likelihood -1573.9 -6893.3 -6895.8 -1547.1 -6898.7 -6901.0
Rho  0.461 0.424 
Note: Average marginal effects and their standard errors are shown. Marginal effects for the dummy variables 
(denoted with #) are calculated for a change from zero to one. The marginal effects of the interaction terms take 
the simultaneous change of both dummy variables from zero to one into account. All estimates contain the 
income at district level, dummies for district type, industry dummies at the 2-digit SIC level and year dummies. 
Standard errors are robust to within company correlation and to heteroscedasticity. Standard errors for columns 2 
and 5 are estimated with bootstrapping with 400 replications. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Robustness Check for Investment Performance (Loan Denial B) 
 Two-step approach One-step 
appr. 
Two-step approach One-step 
appr. 
 First step Second 
step 
 First step Second 
step 
 
Dependent variable Loan denial 
B 
Share inv. Share inv. Loan 
denial B 
Share inv. Share inv. 
Model Probit Tobit Tobit Probit Tobit Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Banking competition # -0.0053**   -0.0055**   
 (0.0023) (0.0023)  
Loan denial B #  -44.76*** -46.76*** -41.66*** -40.49***
  (14.58) (4.27) (12.41) (2.91)
Innovator # 0.012 -3.07*** -3.04***  
 (0.0083) (0.697) (0.679)  
Interaction Loan denial B x   11.01** 11.03**  
Innovator #  (4.67) (4.93)    
Occasional R&D #  0.029** -4.29*** -4.32***
  (0.014) (1.15) (1.08)
Continuous R&D #  0.029** -4.15*** -4.18***
  (0.014) (1.14) (1.08)
Interaction Loan denial B x  -5.37 -5.39
Occ. R&D #     (5.92) (5.79) 
Interaction Loan denial B x  15.80*** 15.67***
Con. R&D #     (6.01) (5.56) 
Return on sales -0.0030*** 0.166*** 0.163*** -0.0029*** 0.163*** 0.165***
 (0.0005) (0.051) (0.044) (0.0005) (0.046) (0.043)
Equity ratio -0.0010*** 0.068*** 0.066*** -0.0010*** 0.067*** 0.068***
 (0.0003) (0.017) (0.016) (0.0002) (0.018) (0.016)
Capital intensity -0.0005*** 0.018 0.017 -0.0005*** 0.015 0.015
 (0.0002) (0.014) (0.015) (0.0002) (0.015) (0.015)
Employees -0.0004*** 0.012** 0.012*** -0.0004*** 0.014** 0.014***
 (0.0001) (0.0059) (0.0048) (0.0001) (0.0059) (0.0048)
Employees2/10,000 0.0011*** -0.029 -0.029* 0.0011*** -0.036 -0.036**
 (0.0003) (0.037) (0.018) (0.0003) (0.035) (0.018)
Age -0.0004** 0.014 0.014 -0.0003* 0.013 0.013
 (0.0002) (0.020) (0.016) (0.0002) (0.018) (0.016)
Age2/10,000 0.013* -1.19 -1.19 0.011 -1.26 -1.27*
 (0.0073) (0.955) (0.679) (0.0074) (0.969) (0.698)
Limited liability # -0.023** 0.613 0.584 -0.026** 0.740 0.759
 (0.011) (0.905) (0.874) (0.011) (0.944) (0.876)
West Germany # -0.043*** 1.31 1.25 -0.047*** 1.62 1.66
 (0.016) (1.15) (1.06) (0.016) (1.18) (1.06)
Support program # -0.040*** 2.77*** 2.73*** -0.040*** 3.00*** 3.03***
 (0.0090) (0.835) (0.757) (0.009) (0.798) (0.758)
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.471 0.272 
  (3.26) (2.77) 
Observations 4606 4606 4606 4602 4602 4602
Pseudo R-squared 0.145 0.054 0.053 0.151 0.053 0.053
Log likelihood -1052.5 -7007.9 -7007.9 -1027.7 -7008.3 -7008.3
Rho  -0.030 0.017 
Note: Average marginal effects and their standard errors are shown. Marginal effects for the dummy variables 
(denoted with #) are calculated for a change from zero to one. The marginal effects of the interaction terms take 
the simultaneous change of both dummy variables from zero to one into account. All estimates contain the 
income at district level, dummies for district type, industry dummies at the 2-digit SIC level and year dummies. 
Standard errors are robust to within company correlation and to heteroscedasticity. Standard errors for columns 2 
and 5 are estimated with bootstrapping with 400 replications. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Basic Results for Financing Mix of Actual Investment (Loan Denial A) 
Panel A 
 Innovator Non-innovator 
 No loan denial (Loan denial A = 0)
Loan denial 
(Loan denial A = 1)
No loan denial 
(Loan denial A = 0) 
Loan denial 
(Loan denial A = 1)
External equity 1.1 6.7 0.2 0.2 
Mezzanine capital 2.1 2.2 1.2 0.6 
Bank loans 43.1 41.7 53.4 54.6 
Internal funds 29.8 25.2 23.0 23.1 
Public funds 18.2 14.0 20.2 17.6 
Other 5.7 10.2 2.0 5.0 
Panel B 
 Occasional or continuous R&D No R&D 
 No loan denial (Loan denial A = 0)
Loan denial 
(Loan denial A = 1)
No loan denial 
(Loan denial A = 0) 
Loan denial 
(Loan denial A = 1)
External equity 0.7 9.2 1.0 1.9 
Mezzanine capital 2.6 3.1 1.3 0.5 
Bank loans 40.8 34.2 49.4 55.4 
Internal funds 30.5 24.4 26.2 25.0 
Public funds 18.9 17.9 18.8 10.7 
Other 6.6 11.3 3.3 6.9 
Note: The financing shares are weighted with the investment volume and thus reflect the overall 
importance of the different financing sources in the sample. The calculation is based on 4,387 
observations for the category innovator and on 4,431 observations for the category R&D type. 
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Table 5: Robustness Check for Financing Mix of Actual Investment (Loan Denial B) 
Panel A 
 Innovator Non-innovator 
 No loan denial (Loan denial B = 0)
Loan denial 
(Loan denial B = 1)
No loan denial 
(Loan denial B = 0) 
Loan denial 
(Loan denial B = 1)
External equity 1.2 16.4 0.2 0.3 
Mezzanine capital 2.1 2.1 1.2 2.3 
Bank loans 43.4 16.6 53.7 32.1 
Internal funds 29.4 36.7 22.8 47.3 
Public funds 18.1 10.0 20.2 1.7 
Other 5.8 18.2 2.0 16.3 
Panel B 
 Occasional or continuous R&D No R&D 
 No loan denial (Loan denial B = 0)
Loan denial 
(Loan denial B = 1)
No loan denial 
(Loan denial B = 0) 
Loan denial 
(Loan denial B = 1)
External equity 0.9 19.3 1.0 3.3 
Mezzanine capital 2.7 1.9 1.3 2.6 
Bank loans 40.8 14.6 50.0 27.7 
Internal funds 30.1 33.1 25.9 48.1 
Public funds 19.0 9.0 18.5 7.6 
Other 6.6 22.0 3.4 10.6 
Note: The financing shares are weighted with the investment volume and thus reflect the overall 
importance of the different financing sources in the sample. The calculation is based on 4,403 
observations for the category innovator and on 4,448 observations for the category R&D type. 
 
 
 
  
Company not 
included in the 
analysis 
Volume of planned but not realized investment 
Figure A1: Sample Selection and Structure of Available Information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
yes no 
no 
no 
yes 
Company not 
included in the 
analysis 
yes 
Positive actual investment 
Conducting loan negotiations 
Negotiations ended with the conclusion of a loan 
Sometimes Never Always 
(loan denial A = 0,  
loan denial B = 0) 
Receiving at least once an offer from 
a bank in an ultimately failed 
negotiation
No  
(loan denial A=1, 
loan denial B=1)
Yes 
(loan denial A=0, 
loan denial B=0)
Yes 
(loan denial A=0, 
loan denial B=0)
No  
(loan denial A=1, 
loan denial B=1)
Volume of actual investment Planned investment 
Receiving at least once an offer from 
a bank in an ultimately failed 
negotiation
A
ppendix 
 
 29 
References 
Audretsch, D. and Elston, J. A. (2002), Does Firm Size Matter? Evidence on the Impact of 
Liquidity Constraints on Firm Investment Behavior in Germany, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 20, 1-17. 
Berger, A. N. and Udell, G. F. (1998), The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles 
of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 22, 613–673. 
Bhattacharya, S. and Ritter, J. R. (1983), Innovation and Communication: Signalling with 
Partial Disclosure, Review of Economic Studies, 50, 331-346. 
Bond, S., Harhofff, D. and Van Reenen, J. (2006), Investment, R&D and Financial 
Constraints in Britain and Germany, Annales d’Économie et de Statistique, forthcoming. 
BVK (2006), BVK Statistik 2005, German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(BVK), Berlin, www.bvk-ev.de. 
Czarnitzki, D. (2006), Research and Development in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: 
The Role of Financial Constraints and Public Funding, Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, 53, 335-257. 
Delbreil, M., Esteban, A., Foulcher, S., Elgg, D., Favale, V., Körting, T., and Varetto, F. 
(2005), Net Worth at Risk, European Committee of Central Balance Sheet Data Offices. 
Dell’Ariccia, G., Detragiache, E. and Rajan, R. (2008), The Real Effect of Banking Crises, 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 17, 89-112. 
Engel D. and Middendorf, T. (2009), Investment, Internal Funds and Public Banking in 
Germany, Journal of Banking and Finance, 33, 2132-2139. 
Freel, M. (2007), Are Small Innovators Credit Rationed?, Small Business Economics, 28, 23-
45. 
Gan, J. (2007a), Collateral, Debt Capacity, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment, Journal of Financial Economics, 85, 709-734. 
Gan, J. (2007b), The Real Effects of Asset Market Bubbles: Loan- and Firm-Level Evidence 
of a Lending Channel, Review of Financial Studies, 20, 1941-1973. 
 30
Gatchev, V. A., Spindt, P. A. and Tarhan, V. (2009), How Do Firms Finance Their 
Investments? The Relative Importance of Equity Issuance and Debt Contracting Costs, 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 15, 179-195. 
Gibson, M. S. (1995), Can Bank Health Affect Investment? Evidence from Japan, Journal of 
Business, 68, 281-308. 
Gompers, P. (1995), Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, 
Journal of Finance, 50, 1461-1489. 
Guiso, L. (1998), High-tech Firms and Credit Rationing, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 35, 39-59. 
Hall, B. (1992), Investment and Research and Development at the Firm Level: Does the 
Source of Financing Matter?, NBER Working Paper No. 4096. 
Hall, B. (2002), The Financing of Research and Development, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 18, 35-51. 
Hancock, D. and, Wilcox, J. A. (1998), The ‘Credit Crunch’ and the Availability of Credit to 
Small Business, Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, 983-1014. 
Heckman J. J. (1976), The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample 
Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models, 
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 5, 475–492. 
Himmelberg, C. and Petersen, B. (1994), R&D and internal finance: A panel study of small 
firms in high-tech industries, Review of Economics and Statistics, 76, 38-51. 
Hottenrott, H. and Peters, B. (2009), Innovative Capability and Financing Constraints for 
Innovation - More Money, More Innovation?, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 09-081. 
Hubbard, R. G. (1998), Capital-market Imperfections and Investment, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 36, 193-225. 
Kaplan, S. and Stromberg, P. (2003), Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: 
Evidence from Venture Capital Contracts, Review of Economic Studies, 70, 281-315. 
Kortum, S. and Lerner, J. (2000), Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to 
Innovation, RAND Journal of Economics, 31, 674-692. 
 31
Li, K. and Prabhala, N. R. (2006), Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance, in Eckbo, E. 
(ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, Chapter 2, 
Elsevier/North Holland, 37-86 
Martin, J. S. and Santomero, A. M. (1997), Investment Opportunities and Corporate Demand 
for Lines of Credit, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 1331-1350. 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. (1958), The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the 
Theory of Investment, American Economic Review, 48, 261-297. 
Mueller, E. and Zimmermann, V. (2009), The Importance of Equity Finance for R&D 
Activity – Are There Differences Between Young and Old Companies?, Small Business 
Economics, 33, 303-318. 
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. (1984), Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When 
Firms have Information that Investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 
187-221. 
Rammer, C., Müller, E., Heger, D., Aschhoff, B., Zimmermann, V. and Reize, F. (2006), 
Innovationspotenziale von kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen [The Innovative Potential 
of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises], ZEW Wirtschaftsanalysen, Vol. 79, Baden-
Baden. 
Reize, F. (2007), KfW-Mittelstandspanel 2007, Mittelstand im Konjunkturhoch – Defizite bei 
Innovationen [KfW Panel of Medium-sized Companies 2007, Medium-sized Companies 
in the Boom Period – Innovation with Deficits], KfW Bankengruppe, Frankfurt am Main. 
Reize, F. and Lo, V. (2008), KfW-Mittelstandspanel 2008, Mittelstand – auch kleine 
Unternehmen – erfolgreich im Ausland! [KfW Panel of Medium-sized Companies 2008, 
Medium-sized Companies – Also Small Ones – Successful Abroad!], KfW 
Bankengruppe, Frankfurt am Main. 
Reize, F. and Zimmermann, V. (2009), KfW-Mittelstandspanel 2009, 2008 – Wirtschaftskrise 
erfasst auch Mittelstand: Investitionen steigen noch. Aber Innovationen lassen nach [KfW 
Panel of Medium-sized Companies 2009, 2008 Economic Crisis Seizes Mittelstand: Still 
Increasing Investments. But Decreasing Innovation], KfW Bankengruppe, Frankfurt am 
Main. 
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981), Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 
American Economic Review, 71, 393-410. 
 32
Winker, P. (1999), Causes and Effects of Financing Constraints at the Firm Level, Small 
Business Economics, 12, 169-188. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
